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In the Supre1ne Court of the
State of Utah

F'IRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N. A., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

CASE
NO. 9926

EDWARD H. BATES,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The question in this case is whether Willis Bates, during his lifetime made an unconditional and irrevocable gift
of his home in Payson, Utah, to his brother, Edward H.
Bates, the defendant herein, sometimes referred to in the
testimony as Ted. The evidence is not in dispute. Plaintiff introduced the only evidence.
On J·anuary 14, 1949, Willis Bates, Edward H. Bates
and Thelma Vest, hereinafter refeiTed to as the custodian,
all resided in Payson, Utah. Defendant married and two
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children were born as issue of that marriage. In September o[ 1956, his first wife died (Tr. 112). In 1960, he remarried and was divorced three months later (Tr. 112).
Willis Bates is nOIW deceased, ;having died on or about the
21st day of January, 1962 (Tr. 113-114). Thelma Vest
SmurtJhwaite was at the time a Notary Public and reference
to her will at times be as custodian.
On January 14, 1949, Willis Bates went to the home
of the custodian and requested her to make a deed, a ·bill
of sale and power olf attorney (Tr. 61-62) .. Plaintiff's attorney asked the custodian the following question: "Tell
us the circumstances surrounding the preparation of tllls
deed" (Tr. 61). Eliminating most o.f the "he said" and
"I said" from the custodian's testimony, we quorte from her ·
testimony as to what Willis Bates said and what the custodian said to him on that occasion.
Willis Bates said, "I 'have received a telephone call
from California offering me employment. I am leaving
irnmediaJtely. If anything happens to me I would want my
brother, Ted, to have the ·home (Tr. 61-62). Could you
help me make the deed in fue event that if .anything happened to me that Ted -could have my home? I have done
much for Lewis who is principal of the High School. I educated Walter. I have never done much for Ted and he is
the baby of the family. I've always felt compassionate
toward Ted and I have always felt that I would like to do
more fo~ hl.m if ever I was in a position to do so. He is
married and has had kind of a rough time so if you will
help me with this I would appreciate it. And if you would
hold this for me, I would appreciate that too. In the event
that anything happens to me you give it to Ted, but I
1
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don't want Ted to know that you have this document unless something happens to me. That is just our secret."
The custodian said, ''Willis I will be glad to help youthat is ~how I happened to help him at this time."
The attorney for the plaintiff also propounded the
following questions to the custodian: (Tr. 66)
Question: ''The terms of the trust of the things you
were ·holding was to deliver them to Ted in case something
happened to Mr. Bates."
Answer: "Yes."
Question: "You lmow if it was in the case of his
death?"
Answer: "In the case of death. He did not want
Ted to know that he had a deed to him unless he passed
away. He wanted Ted to ·have the deed and the home in
the event something 'happened.''
The custodian continued in continuous possession of
the deed from January 14, 1949, until the death of Willis
Bates in January, 1962, exeept on two occasions when the
escrow holder was leaving foc California ·and on each of
these occasions she went to Willis Bates and told him she
was going away and that she did not want to take the deed
with ·her, that perhaps if she left it, it might be destroyed
and requested Willis Bates to hold tile deed until her return
and on each occasion upon her return to Payson, Willis
Bates returned the deed to her (Tr. 63-64).
When the defendant re-married in 1960, Willis Bates
came to the custodian and stated: (Tr. 67-68) "I am quite
concerned over this marriage of Ted's. You know I've
thought about the deed. I want Ted and those children
to have the home. I would not want that woman or any
of her kin or her family to have one sand of one brick of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

any part of that place. It is for Ted and those motherless
children." I said, 'Willis, You know, if you feel that way,
I think it might be a good idea for you to go around the
corner and have Mr. HOdgson . . . . the attorney . . . .
draw you up a letter as to what you would like dooe.' He
said, "Well, I have been awful upset over this. If anything·
happens to me I would want Ted to record the deed and
then I would want the children rto have the home.' . . .
He didn't ask for his papers. I still kept the papers that
he had left with me. One day I saw him and he said, 'I
feel better. Ted is getting a divorce from the woman . . . .
We will leave things like they are, I feel relieved. Will you
please continue to take care of the things and just let it go
as it is?' I said, 'I still think, Willis, you ought to see an
attorney. Sin-ce you drew that up, you have had a lot of
other things in yomt possession, you have other things.'
He said, 'We will take care of that later on', and he went
on about his business.''
Two or three days before Willis Bates' death, in January, 1962, he requested the custodian to come and see him
at the Veterans Hospital in Salt Lake City and the custodian testified that on this occasion the donor said: "You
know ·horw I feel aJbourt my home . . . . I want Ted to record the deed when I am gone. I want you to deliver the
deed to Ted and I want Ted, if ·he has not severed his relationship with this woman, I want you to have Ted make
a deed to those motherless children. The :home is for Ted
and his kids" (Tr. 68). Willis Bates further told the custodian: "I would like Ted to record the deed and make a
deed to Rose Mary and Joe, Ted's motherless children . . . ._
Upon my death my home will be Ted's and I want you to
give the deed to Ted and take care of it" (Tr. 70).
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The ~~odian further testified as follows: "He left
the deed with me in 1949 in my safe keeping and in my
care and custody and he knew that I would follow out his
wishes"
71. "In his heart, ·he wanted Ted to ·have
that place. He never, ever, ever mentioned anything about
his other lots, his car or his personal property or anything
other than in the beginning there" (Tr. 72).
Custodian furtheT testified ·concerning her visit with
the decedent at the hospital:
Question (;by attorney for plaintiff): "And did you
have a conversation with him concerning what he ·wanted
done with this deed, or what he wanted done with this
property in the event Mr. Bates' marriage to his wife was
still valid?"
Answer (by custodian) : "He again reiterated the fact
that ·he wanted this deed delivered to his brother, Ted. And
for Ted and his children to benefit from this home and
this deed. That was his greatest wish and desire."
She furrther testified that if Willis Bates 1had asked for
a return of the deed she would have returned it to him (Tr.
75).
She also said th•at Willis Bates always told ~her to deliver the deed to Ted and have it taken care of which she
said meant to record it (Tr. 76).

err.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE BURDEN OF PROVING NO~N-DELIVERY OF
THE DEED WAS UPON THE PLAINTIFF.

In Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P. 2d 355,
this Court said:
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''~he

possession of a deed, fully executed, in the hands
of the grantee, is prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence of its delivocy. It, therefore, follows that ~he who
disputes this presumption has the burden of proof,
and must show that there has been no delivery. And
not only must this presumption be overcome, but it is
held that there is such a strong implication that it has
been delivered when it is found in the hands of the
grantee that only strong evidence can rebut the presumption.

"And not only is the burden orf proving non-delivery

upon the plaintiffs, but the inference of delivery arising
from possession of the deed by the grantee and from
the recording thereof is entitled to great and controlling weight and can only be o~ercome by clear and
convincing evidence. (Citing cases)."
POINT ll

THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUSTAIN THE BURDEN OF PROO·F AND THE JUDGMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THJE FINDTNGS OF FACT OR THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
The Court failed to make any findings as to the reason which prompted the donor to make and execute the
deed. The Court also failed to quote the words of the donor when he delivered the deed to the custodian.
The Court refused to make a finding that the donor
said nothing to the escrow holder about repossessing the
deed or changing it, although requested to do so, (R. 33)
and this was error. Giauque v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah
89, 129 Pac. 429.
It is evident that the Court's decision was based upon
the following findings:
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( 1) The Cotu1: found that the grantor occupied the
premises and paid the taxes and expenses thereon from
the date the deed was made until his death.
(2) That the donor, at the instance and request of
the custodian, had possession of the deed on two occasions
for short intervals.
3) That because the grantor, eleven years after January 14, 1949, when the deed was delivered to the custodian, said to the custodian that he did not want the donor's wife to have any part of the home.
(4) That thirteen years after the delivery of the
deed the donor told the custodian that if the donee had
not severed 'his relations with the second wife, he wanted
the donee to record the deed and requested the custodian
to have the donee make a deed to the children.
We treat the questions raised in the order started:
(1) In Lossee v. Jones, 120 Utah 385, 235 P 2d 132,
this Court held that the deeds were delivered where, after
the deeds were executed, the grantor rented the property
to some of the grantees.

In the case of Burnham, et al. v. Eschler, 116 Utah 61,
208 P. 2d 96, the deeds were made on December 20, 1938.
The whereabouts of the deeds was undisclosed until March,
1946. \vhen they we-re delivered to the grantee's husband
with instructions that the deeds not be given to the grantee until after the grantor's death, because she "didn't want
the grantee to feel any personal obligation to her while she
\Vas still living." The grantor continued to pay the taxes
and other ex~penses on the property until her death on
March 30; 1947. This Court held there was a good delivery.
(2) In Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, 53 Utah 236, 177
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Pac. 763, this Court held the deed was delivered where the
facts showed that the grantor had repossessed the deeds
and tore them up, made a deed to an uncle off the grantees, and the grantor had consented that the property
deeded by him to his children be traded for other property.
See also Johnson v. Cooper, 255 P 1112, Kan. The deed
was made in aJbout 1915 or 1916 ·and delivered at that time
to one Gardner, cashier of a bank. The deed remained in
the bank until after March, 1920, when the grantor took
the deed into his possession and destroyed it. The Court

held that the deed had been delivered.
referred to hereinafter in more detail.

This case will be

(3) In the Johnson v. Cooper case, supra, we quote
from the Court's opinion: "Lethia Hayes, now Lethia Johnson, the plaintiff, went to live with Kesler and his wife and
remained there until she married, a period of about three
years. During the first year she received some wages.
Thereafter she simply made her home with the Keslers,
kept house and looked after Mrs. Kesler, who was an invalid. On October 20, 1915, she married. Mrs. Kesler died
December 15, 1915. Shortly after the death of Mrs. Kesler, the deed was executed and delivered to Gardner, the
cashier of the local hank. The reasons given by Kesler for
making the deed was that the gmntee had nursed his wife
and he felt she had earned it.
Gardner testified that the deed was left with him for
safe keeping and for delivery after Kesler's death and that
Kesler said: "If anthing happens to me, at my death, I
want you to give this to Miss Lethia Hayes.'' Gardner
testified that Kesler said: "He wanted it laid away so that
when he died the property would go to Lethia Hayes. It
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is to be put away and when I am gone, she can have it and
have it recorded."

The deed remained in the bank until after March 20,
1920, when Kesler took the deed from the lbank and destroyed it. The trial court concluded thart Kesler intended
to constitute the banker his agent to keep the deed for him
and to carry out a gift to take effect in.rthe future.
The evidence was that Kesler had said that Lethia was
cool towards him and he therefore destroyed the deed. The
trial Court held there was no delivery. The lower court's
judgment was reversed, the Supreme Court saying ,fuat
there was a good delivery and that Kesler's subsequenrt
conduct in getting the deed and destroying it had no effect on the previous completed delivery.
In Bury v. Young, 33 Calif. 338, the Court said: "Where
a grantor executed a deed orf his la.p.d and delivers it to another 'wi·th instructions only to hold without recwding until
his death and then deliver it to the grantee, the grantor
cannot recall the deed or alter its provisions and he 'has no
interest in the land except a life estate."
On the question of whether a grantor had power to
recall a deed delivered in escrow, evidence of subsequent
acts are inadmissible to shorw his intentions at the time ~he
made the deed. The Court said: "There are well considered
cases holding that even though the grantor delivers the deed
to the depositary reserving the right to recall it, yet if ~he
dies without recalling and the deed is then delivered, such
delivery is complete and entire and carries title.''
Quoting from ALR 52, at page 1247: "The authorities
uniformly hold that where a g~rantor has deposited a deed
with a third person, to be d~livered to the grantee after the
death .of the grantor, reserving no dominion or control over
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the same, he cannot subsequently, by withdrawing or destroying the deed, or by other acts indicating a subsequent
change of intention affect a delivery thus completed.' '(Citing a long list of cases, among which is that of Gappmayer
v. Wilkinson~ supra. )
(4) We submit ·without citing authorities that this
finding affords no basis whatever to ·prove non;..delivery of
the deed .
POINT ill
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THERE WAS A
COav.IPLETED GIFT AN\D THE JUDG:MENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE REVERSED AND THE
CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS TO ENTER
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT.

Many·of the eases having to do with delivery of deeds
are cited in Ameri<m1 Law of Property, Volume m, Section 12.67, page 318. We think the law is so clearly and
succinctly set forth in that section that we quote at length
firom it:
"'Delivery to Custodian or Escrow Agent. When the
grantor deposits his deed with a custodian for delivery
to the grantee on the happening of a certain event, usually the death of the grantor, there are in fact two
deliveries, one to the custodian and later one to the
grantee. It is usually held that the deed takes effect
at the first delivery, (citing Gappmayer v. Wilkenson,
53 Utah 235, 177 Pac 763) even though the grantee
may have had no knowedge at that time of the existence of the deed. The effect is that at date of the
first delivery there has been transferred to the grantee a fee title, subject to a tenancy in the grantor, usually a life estate, pending occurrence of the event which
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is to terminate that interest. Accordingly the effect
is not changed by the grantee dying prior to the gran-

tor or, by the same reasoning, prior to the happening
of any other event on which the second delivery is conditioned. The decisions, mostly of an earlier period
than those just cited, which held that the custodian
was agent of the grantor for the purpose of making
delivery and ·that the deed became operative by the
second delivery, proved to be impracticable in cases
where prior to the second delivery the grantor died or
became incompetent or even where he conveyed or
mortgaged to a party with notice. Accordingly it was
said that 'when it can make no difference, the deed
takes effect from the second delivery; but if it does
make a difference, then the deed takes effect from the
first delivery.' ".Dhe final delivery appears to consummate the first, or, as it is said, the finally delivery relates back to the first so that the deed then takes effect as of the date of the. original deed so that death,
insanity, or coverture of the grantor after the first
delivery cannot vitiart:e the transfer upon happening
of the-contingent event or upon occurrence of the second delivery. And as to an intervening purchaser,
mortgagee, or creditor, if he has notice from the· recording of the deed or otherwise, the grantee is protected by the first delivery; with the opposite res·ult,
of course, when there is a lack of notice. In other
words, although the legal title may remain in a technical sense in the grantor until the condition occurs
on which the second delivery depends, during the interval the granrtee has a present right subject to a condition, and on the happening of the contingency, the
legal interest vests in the grantee as of the date of
the first delivery.
"However, for either delivery to be effective to
pass title, the grantor must have surrendered all doSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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minion and C(){[ltrol over the interest to be conveyed.
If he reseTV'es a powe~ to recall the deed, by w~d, act,
or writing, and regardless of whether he ever exercises
it or nort, no delivery has resulted and no transfer occurs. (Oiting Singleton v. Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 212 Pac
63). Except as by some other act the. grantor may
be estopped to deny delivery, this is true even though
the mstlrument may come into the ·custody of the grantee - it will still be lacking the final act required to
put it into .effect. . But if delivered to the custodian
with no reservation of right of rec8.n, a subsequent attempt to recall the deed, or, even a repossession or
destruction of it by the grantor, is of no effect-it is
the intention which the grantor eocpressed to the depositary at the time of delivecy which is controlling
· .. ~'Practi·cally all of the deliveries of deeds to custodians considered to this point depend solely upon di. rections to the grantor to the custodian. Whatever
contract exists is between these two, and often the gran. tee knows nothing of the matter until the second delivery. The event upon which the latter depends is
··usually the death of the grantoT, sometimes coupled
·with one of the collateral conditions just considered."
In the Singleton v. Kelly case, supra, at the request
of the grantor the Utah County Swveyor prepared a deed
and handed it to the granrtoT, who then handed it to the
grantee. The scrivner advised the grantor that to make
the deed effective the deed had to be notarized and that
he, the scrivner, was nort a notary. Later, the grantor and
the .grantee went to a James H. Clark who acknowledged
the deed. After taking the acknowledgment, Clark asked
the_ deceased, the grantor, ""'hether 'he was turning the deed
over to Thomas S. Kelly then or whether he expected rum
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to have it after his death. The grantor replied: "I mean
to keep control of it while I live." Thereupon, Mr. Clark,
in the presence of the deceased and Thomas S. Kelly, wrote
a letter of instructions addressed to J ames H. Clark and
signed by the deceased, William E. Kelly, as follows:
1

"I h~rewith deliver with this a warranty deed, made
and executed the 16th day of May, A. D. 1914, for
lands in Sec. 36 and 35, Township 5 South of one East,
Salt Lake Meridian, favor of Thomas S. Kelly, and I
hereby e~ressly instruct the said James H. Clark, or
any one to whom these presents may come, to deliver
the same at my death to the said ~homas S. Kelly, or
his heirs, reserving, however, the right to withdraw
or change same during my life.''

This court held that the writing was part of. the transaction and the court held that there was no delivery.
Willis S. Bates, at the time of delivering ,the deed to
Thelma Vest, the custodian, made no reservations whatever concerning the deed. He merely said, "If anything
happens to me, give it to Ted and have him record it".
We quote from the court's decision in Wilson v. Wilson, 32 Utah 169, 89 Pac. 643:
"It has been determined by this Court that where a
grantor delivers a deed to a third person, absolutely as
his deed, without reservation, and without intending
to reserve any control over the instrument, though it
is not to be delivered to the grantee until the grantoq-'s
death, the deed, when delivered is valid and takes effect from the first delivery. Also, that if after such
delivery the deeds are repossessed by the grantor or
destroyed, the grantor does not thereby revest himself with title."
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Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, supra. Lewis B. Gappmayer
and four other infants, by their guardian art litem, Julies
And€'rson, and Anna la Priel GappmayeT brought this action against the defendants Walter Wilkenson and Hattie
Wilkenson, to have declared null and void and ill no effect
a conveyance made by the defendant William R. Nelson of
certain real property located in Utah County to said defendants Wilkenson and that fue title to the same be revested in the plaintiffs; plaintiffs also asked that the title
to the premises conveyed by tJhe defendants Wilkenson ·to
their c~defenda.nt Nelson, and by said Nelson conveyed
to these plaintiffs, be restored to, and be decreed to :be the
property of the said Walter Wilkenson and Hattie Wilken-

son.

. :The facts in ·this case are substantially as follows: The
mother of the plaintiffs died in 1912 and the. minors con-

tinued to live with their father for ·a!bout 2 years and the
fat4er then decided to remarry. In order to make provision ·fo~ the minor children, he, on or about the 7-th day
of April, 1914, deeded them the land in question and deposited this deed with. the Utah County Abstract Company
to deliver to 1Jhe narned grantees upon his death. The lan<J
was then mortgaged to Nelson, an uncle. In August, 1915,
an a.rrangement was made between the father and the uncle
by which it was agreed that the mortgage to Nelson should
be paid by a conveyance of this same prorperty to Nelson.
The deed was executed oy Gappmayer and Nelson and deposited ·with the same Utah County .AJbstract Company to
deliver the deeds to the children upon t!he death of Nelson,
subject to the right on the part of Nelson to sell part of
the properrty to repay the indebtedness owed to him. In
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St"ptembt-..r, 1915, Nelson was induced to record the deed he
had received from Gappmayer and this was done with the
approval of Gappmayer with the understanding that this
property should be exchanged foT property in Sanpete County owned by the Wilkensons. This plan was carried out
and Wilkenson conveyed the Sanpete property to Nelson
and Nelson conveyed the Sanpete property to the plaintiffs
and placed this deed with the Utah County A:bstract Company.
The trial court dismissed plaintiff's action, holding that
Nelson did not intend that the deeds executed by him and
left with the Abstract Company be a present or absolute
conveyance. This court reversed the lower court and we
quote from this court's decision:
"It is apparent all through the record that it was the
desire and intention of both the father and the uncle
that at the death of the uncle and of the father the
plaintiffs, the children of the deceased sisteT of Nelson, should have and enjoy the premises conveyed by
them. Apparently no other consideration induced the
arrangement to be made, and it was consummated on
this date, to-wit, the 24th day of August, 1915, when
this escrow agreement was finally executed and the
papers delivered to the abstract company. It is true
that the subsequent acts of the defendant Nelson are
not consistent with this construction, but it is apparent
that that was the intent of the parties at that time,
and any act or transaction afteiWards was a subsequent thought. As determined hy this court in the
case of Wilson v. Wilson, supra, the right of the plaintiffs became fixed by the acts of the parties at this
date, and the defendant Nelson could not revest himself of any interest or title in the property, by his subsequent acts."
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In rthe case of Lossee v. Jones, 120 Utah 385·, 235 P.
2d 132, :this court held there was a delivecy where the facts
were substantially as foilows:

A widowed mother made deeds to each of her children
and placed these deeds in her safety deposit box. Later she
became ill and had one of her daughters get the deeds from
the safety deposift box and deposit them in a drawer near
where the mothe'r lay ill. The mother continued to rent
the property to some of the grantees. The daughter testified that the mother could have removed the deeds from
the bureau drawer had she wanted to; and that if the
mother had demanded them, she would have turned the
deeds over to her. This ·court said that the fact the deeds
were placed by the daughter in a ·blU"eau drawer accessible
to the mother is not determining, if they are delivered unconditionally and without right to recall them. The court
further said:

"Nor does the daughter's statement that if the mother
had changed her mind and wanted the deeds back she
would have given them to her necessarily affect the
question of delivery. It is obvious in the present case
that the daughter's conjecture as· to whether the
mother would let ·her remove the deeds from the
drawer during her lifetime has no weight upon the
question of delivery, since it does nort appear that the
mother in any \Vay qualified the delivery, nor that the
deeds were placed in the drawer near ·her at the instance of the mother. Once there had been a good delivery, there was nothing done or said thereafter which
had any effect to invalidate the deeds."
This court concluded thart the record disclosed an unequivocaJble and valid delivery of the deeds to the daughter.
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Nellie, as trustee for the grantees and title was thus conveyed to them.
It is not essential to a valid delivery to a third pe~rson
that the grantee knew of the existence of the deed before
the grantor's death. 26 CJS, !Deeds, Section 46, page 250.
To the same effect, see Brandt v. Brandt, 260 Pac 342, and
Neely v. Buster, 195 Pac. 736.
See also Cell v. Drake, 100 P. 2d 949, Idaho. This is
an action by the plaintiff to quiet title to certain land. A
Mrs. Sandlin, while ill, called in an attorney and had him
make a deed conveying the property to the plaintiff, Cell.
The attorney showed the deed to the plaintiff and kept

the deed himself and did not deliver it to Cell. The attorney testified as follows:
"Mrs. Sandlin said, 'take this deed and put it in your
safe and keep it in your safe and at any time after my

death that Mr. Cell asks for it, why give it to him'".
On cross-examination, the attorney who had drawn
the deed also testified as follows:

"After I took it and kept it in my safe about a year
and a half, after-in October, I think, 1933, Mrs. Sandlin came to my office one day and said that she wanted
to get all of her papers, and so my stenographer went
to the files and got this envelope out and handed to
her all of the papers, including that deed.
"Question: You have never seen it since?
"An·swer: I have never seen it since."
The Court said, and we quote:
''The fact that the depositary returned the deed to the
grantor on demand does not affect the legal status
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whaJtever. He was bound by the instructions given
him at the time the deed was deposited with him.''
See Jobse v. United States National Bank of POrtland,

21 P. 2d 221, Oregon, where the ~court 'held that the deed
had been delivered. The decedent went to the bank and
had the cashier prepare two deeds conveying two tracts
of land to the plaintiff, his wife, who was present at the
time. ':Dhe casme~r prepared the deeds as directed and when
signed the grantor signed a letter which read as foUows:

"Gentlemen: Please deliver attached two deeds one
to49 and 90/100 acres and one to one-half interest in
roadway being what is known as ,fue Taughmann Place
situate in Wilsonville, Oregon, to my wife, Mary Jobse,
upon my dearth."
This was all done on May 20, 1911. On September
23, 1931, the maker of the deeds died leaving a will which
gave rthe property described in the deeds to the defendant bank in trust and provided that the net income should
be paid· over to plaintiff during her natural life or until
she should remarry, and that upon ~her death or remarriage
the income should then be diwded between two of decedent's nephews, the defendants in this case. The evidence
showed .that the only instructions given by the decedent
were those above named. After the cashier left the employ· of ·the bank, the decedent withdrew the papers from
the bank and deposited them in another bank. This action is by the widow to quiet title to the property. The
court said:
"W:herther there has been a delivery is a question of
fact rather than of law, depending upon tlle intent of
the grantor to vest an estate in the grantee. Hoff-
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mire v. Martin supra. It is not necessary that the
delivery be made to the grantee personally. It may
be made to any one acting for and in his behalf. Hence,
it is sufficient if made to a third party or to a stranger who holds it for and is to deliver it to the grantee,
and this applies if delivered to a third party where the
second delivery is to be postponed unrtil the death of
the grantor. (Citing cases) . . . . . . It is elementary
that there can be but one delivery by the grantor of
the same deed, for if the first is effectual the second
cannot be of any avail. It is an invaria:ble rule that
a valid deed, if once delivered, cannot be defeated by
any subsequent act unless it be by virtue of some condition contained in the deed itself.
"The actual test of inrtent of the grantor by his actions
\Vas not ·whether ~he retained possession of the property but whether he retained possession of the deed.''
See Anderson v. Mauk, 67 P. 2d 429, Oklahoma. In
1931, Peter Fisher, the owner of the real estarte involved
in the action joined in the execution of three deeds covering different portions of real estate owned by him. The
deeds had been prepared by Alva D. Mauk. Each of the
deeds was to a different grantee. On that date, the grantor delivered the deeds to the notary public, Mauk, with
the following instructions:

"I am going to give these deeds to you to hold until
after I and my wife die, and when we have been put
away, I want you to see that these deeds are given
to the parties that you made the deeds . . . . . that
the deeds are made to."
In January, 1932, Fisher and his wife executed a deed
to FoiTeSt D. Anderson as the grantee which covered all
of the property described in the three deeds previously de-
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livered to the notary pUlblic. Fisher died on March 3, 1932.
The action was by C. D. Mauk as administrator of the estate of Peter Fisher against Anderson and others. '111e
court held that there was a good delivery.
See the case of Dieckman v. Jaeger, 170 Pac 727, Ore.
This is an action of ejectment. In October, 1909, Heney
Carl Dieckman executed a deed conveying to Emilie Dieckman a tract of 160 acres of land. On December 10 of the
same year he deposited the deed with J. W. Thornton and
Son in which the ~pertinent part of the instruction is as
follows:
"In case of my death, you will please deliver the attached deed from myself to Emilie Dieckman."

Thereafter, he 1conveyed to other parties a portion of
said land but not the forty acres involved in this action.
Grantor died in March, 1912. The court said:
''It is settled in this jurisdiction that: 'If the grantor
parts with all dominion and control over the deed, ~
serving no right to recall it or alter its provisions, it
is a good delivery, and the grantee will, upon the death
of the grantor, succeed to the title.'"
Another case to the same effect is reported in

164 P. 2d, 551, Cal. This is an action by Bertha Herman as
administratrix of the estate of Helen B. Glenn, deceased,
against Joseph L. Mortenson, individually, and as executor
of the estate of Virginia R. E. Robertson, aka Virginia R.
Robertson and as Virginia E. Robertson, deceased, to quiet
title to land.
The defendant is the executor of Mrs. Robertson's last
will and the residuary legatee and devisee and in possession
of the property and claims ti-tle under the will, subject to
administration.
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On July 5th, 1934, Mrs. Robertson requested a lawyer named Staats to draw a will for her which she executed that day, and in this will she devised the property
in question to Ellen B. Glenn and named her as executrix.
After making the will, Mrs. Robertson told Staats that she
also wanted to deed the property to Mrs. Glenn. He advised her against it and explained the consequences if she
did that. Mrs. Robertson insisted on having the deed made
and asked the attorney, Staats, to ~hold it for :her with instructions to deliver it to Mrs. Glenn upon Mrs. Robertson's death. On February 13, 1941, Mrs. Robertson ex&cuted the olographic will, which will was in probate when
this action was commenced. When Staats learned of Mrs.
Robertson's death on July 24, 1943, he also learned that
the grantee had died over five years ·before, to-wit: November 29, 1937.
The court said, and we quote: ''The rule estaJblished
by a long line of decisions in this state headed by the pioneer case of Bury v. Young, is stated in the recent case of
Wilkerson v. SeiJb, 20 Cal. 2d, 556, 127 P. 2d 904 as follows: 'That the grantor's irrevOCaJble delivery of a deed
to a third person, with instructions that it be given to the
grantee upon the grantor's death, has the effect of vesting
the title to the property immediately in the grantee, qualified only by a life tenancy in the grantor, and the depositary thereby becomes a trustee of the deed for the grantee.' ''. Citing other cases.
1

CONCLUSION
On the record there can be no question but that Willis
Bates delivered the deed to Thelma Vest Smurthwaite with
instructions to her to deliver the deed to the defendant if
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anything happened to the grantor; the term "if anything
happened" meaning upon the death of tl1e grantor. The
record is devoid of any evidence that when the deed was
delivered to the custodian, the grantor made any reservation of his right to·control the deed and anything the grantor may ~have said eleven or thirteen years thereafter was
immaterial and could not undo what was done on January 14, 1949, and in fact the grantor made no attempt to
change, recall or alter the deed.
The fact that the grantor had possession of the deed
on two occasions at the instance of the custodian is not
evidence of non-delivery. To the contrary, the grantor's
immediate return of the deed to the custodian as early as
possible indicated that he felt he had made a completed
gift.

The fact that the grantor paid the taxes and expenses
on the property does not prove non-delivery.
The fact that the custodian states that she would have
r~ed the deeds is not evidence of non-delivery.
In
othoo words, merely because the custodian misconceived
her duty is not evidence of non-delivery.
Respectfully submitted,
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